Chapter 14
EPILOGUE

If the remaining ships of Centre Force had continued their sortie toward Leyte Gulf, it would have been interesting to see how RADM Oldendorf's old battleships and Seventh Fleet surface forces would have dealt with them. As stated earlier, the Seventh Fleet supply of armor-piercing ammunition was nearly depleted after their action in Surigao Strait. Since the old battleships were at least five knots slower than those of Centre Force, a running fight was not desirable.

At the direction of VADM Kinkaid, RADM Oldendorf deployed three old battleships, five cruisers, and two destroyer squadrons twenty-five miles eastward of the northern entrance to Surigao Strait. The remaining forces belonging to the Seventh Fleet were kept well inside of Leyte Gulf. Whether these two groups could have effectively engaged and defeated the IJN Centre Force would never be known.

The figures below do not include those ships damaged on both sides.

1 Light Carrier: PRINCETON

2 Escort Carriers: GAMBIER BAY & ST LO

2 Destroyers: HOEL & JOHNSTON

USS SAMUEL B. ROBERTS (DE 413)
Action Report

The success which was obtained by this Task Unit, being unsupported by heavy ships, submarines, or adequate aircraft, in what might be called a surprise engagement with an overwhelming enemy task force seems like a myth.  Why this ship was not sunk long before it was will ever be a mystery - except for one concrete fact which is here advanced, - namely that the silhouette of the WGT type destroyer escort furnishes no real point of aim, and is, defensively, one of the best silhouettes of all the navies of the world.  This may also account for the fact that no hits were received in the bridge superstructure.  The fact that we could stay afloat for over an hour within 7500 yards gun range of Japanese cruisers also seems to testify to the very pitiful efforts of Japanese gunnery, in so far as this action is concerned, as well as the kindness of providence.

• The misidentification of Taffy III escort carriers as fast carriers (CVs), capable of 30+ knots. This misidentification led to two consequential misinterpretations. Six or more large-deck American carriers lay before him, obviously with an appropriate number of cruiser and destroyer escorts. Vice Admiral Kurita continued to believe throughout the battle that his forces were "not catching up" with the fleeing American carriers.
  
  
• The misidentification of Taffy III’s destroyers as "BALTIMORE" Class heavy cruisers and the destroyer escorts as "FLETCHER" Class destroyers caused his fleet to proceed with unnecessary caution. This overestimation of his opposition came at a critical time and caused him to proceed with needless caution throughout the engagement.
  
  
• The ships of Centre Force had become widely separated and were not effectively coordinating their attack. This was due to VADM Kurita’s imprudent order of "General Attack."
  
  
• Vice Admiral Kurita did not know the location of all of ADM Halsey's fast carriers and battleships, but logic led him to believe they were nearby and ably ready to provide immediate support to the Taffies. Upon exiting San Bernardino Strait unopposed, he believed he would be under air attack at first light from the carriers of Third Fleet. The poor intelligence gathered by the Japanese during this stage of the battle hampered their efforts throughout the entire Battle of Leyte Gulf. 

CTU 77.4.3/COMCARDIV 25 Action Report
RADM Clifton A.F. Sprague, USN

The success attendant upon the efforts to escape the devastating enemy fire was remarkable almost to the point of being unexplainable. After being under enemy fire for two and one half hours at ranges closing to under 10,500 yards, this Task Unit lost one carrier, and two DDs and one DE. These escorts were lost as a result of their heroic torpedo attack into the center of the enemy under very heavy fire. U.S.S. ST. LO (Ex MIDWAY) was lost sometime later, after the enemy had begun retirement, as a result of a successful suicide dive into the middle of her flight deck and subsequent explosions. From almost the beginning of the action, heavy funnel and FS smoke was laid by all vessels. This, together with a providential rain squall, seemed to bother the enemy fire control parties to an unusual degree, resulting at times in lulls in the firing, and perhaps indicating lack of use of radar fire control for surface gunnery.

As to why the main Jap plan failed, there are the following concrete reasons:

(a) The losses and damage sustained by the southern group and the failure of any of them to force the Surigao Straits.

(b) The losses and damage sustained by Jap forces en route to the Philippine area from our submarines.

(c) The losses and damage sustained from CVE air attack.

(d) The poor training of the suicide squadron in locating and crippling the CVEs and thus preventing further damage from our air attack.

(e) And very fundamentally, the decision of the Jap commander to retreat at the time he did. 

• Vice Admiral Kurita had lost tactical control of Centre Force when BB YAMATO was forced to run north to evade DD HEERMANN’s torpedo spread. In my opinion, this was one of the single-most influential events of the entire battle....another decision made in the heat of battle.... What would he have done if he knew heavy cruisers TONE and HAGURO were less than 10,000 yards from the remaining escort carriers shortly after 0900 when he ordered the recall order? Indeed, his forces were widespread and under constant harassment from Taffies aircraft, but the American airpower present at this stage was still erratic and unorganized. Had he chosen to continue, the remaining warships of Taffy III were nearly out of 5-inch ammunition, several were severely damaged and they were hanging on by a thread.
  
  
• The sighting of Taffy II, with several more "fast carriers" and "BALTIMORE" Class heavy cruisers made VADM Kurita weary and made him reconsider what he was up against . . . .  

CTU 77.4.3/COMCARDIV 25 Action Report
RADM Clifton A.F. Sprague, USN

It is not too difficult to surmise with some accuracy the contributory reasons why the Jap OTC made the very poor decision of breaking off the action with the CVEs and withdrawing the same way he came. From our viewpoint, this decision seems to be the only sure factor which made the difference between success and failure for the Japs. Had this decision not been made, the Jap main body could have, and should have, waded through and completed the destruction of this Task Unit, and continuing to the south, would have found our naval opposition very low on ammunition following their night action. In Leyte Gulf, they could have successfully accomplished their mission and retired through Surigao Straits as was originally intended. During this time, they would have been exposed to only minor damage from weakened CVE air attacks (whose largest bomb was 500-pound SAP) plus belated air strikes from Task Group 38.1 which were going to occur anyway. 

• Centre Force was not receiving its promised air cover. The Japanese air forces in the Philippines, both army and naval, failed miserably by providing little or no coordinated support. Although the Japanese had reconnaissance aircraft out continuously, the reports made by these aircraft were not reaching the people who needed the information.
  
  
• Admiral Kurita was weary and not in the best of health after several days of little rest. Besides being forced to swim for his life after the loss of CA ATAGO, he most likely did not get enough sleep during the entire deployment.

Next we will examine what the Japanese did right at Leyte Gulf:

• Vice Admiral Ozawa’s Northern Force conducted their operations according to plan. He alone completed his primary mission successfully - drawing the American Third Fleet northward, away from the Leyte invasion area.
  
  
• Had Centre Force proceeded along into Leyte Gulf, instead of retreating when their goal was in reach, there would have been nothing along the way to stop them.

Despite all their errors, the Japanese came very close to accomplishing their mission at Leyte Gulf. Their original plan, with all of its crucial inadequacies and poor planning, nearly worked.

Although the Battle of Leyte Gulf resulted in an overwhelming American victory, much did go wrong on the side of the U.S. Navy. Here, in my eyes, is how the American’s blundered: 

• Quite easily put,....San Bernardino Strait!  
  
  
• The communications between Third and Seventh Fleets were very poor. This was the king pin of the American failures at the Battle of Leyte Gulf, particularly the messages between the admirals and their fleet commands regarding the safeguard of San Bernardino Strait.  

CTU 77.4.3/COMCARDIV 25 Action Report
RADM Clifton A.F. Sprague, USN

FACTORS WHICH ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE INFLUENCED THE OTC OF THE JAP FLEET:

• The information that his southern force had been repulsed; if his communication channels were as clogged as ours there is a good reason to believe he would be getting sufficient information of this situation to evaluate it.
  
  
•  The fact that he was under continuous air attack coupled with the fact that his plans included definite interruption of CVE air attack by suicide dive bombers may have led him to believe that he was under air attack from other than CVEs. If such was the case, the pursuit and destruction of T.U. 77.4.3 did not justify the damage he would receive from such air attack, and placed the success of his surface action in Leyte Gulf in serious doubt. To support this theory, he had a small advance force of 3 DD well to the southeast which made visual contact with T.U. 77.4.2 (6 CVEs, 3 DDs, 4 DEs) and he may well have received a false or alarming contact report from these scouts. 
   
• The fact that all CVEs in T.U. 77.4.3 were seen to be straddled repeatedly and were all smoking copiously may have caused him to think that they were more seriously damaged than they actually were and promoted the decision that a continued pursuit to the kill was needless.  
  
  
•  He himself was behind schedule, possible due to air attack the previous afternoon. He probably should have arrived off Leyte Gulf before dawn, completed the bombardment by noon and departed the area before our heavy forces could be recalled from their activity to the northward. It seems reasonable that he intended to withdraw west of the Philippines under cover of darkness the night of the 25th, and it was essential that he placed the land barrier of the islands between himself and the returning U.S. heavy forces. 

The smoke screen created by the escorts of Taffy III played a major role in the escape of the escort carriers.  Therefore I feel this section merits mention in detail.  All ship specific information is taken directly from their Action Reports.

USE BY ESCORTS OF TAFFY III

There were two primary types of chemical smoke available for use by the destroyers and destroyer escorts, FS or FM. 

FS generated a dense, white, corrosive smoke.  It was a solution of sulfur trioxide in the liquid chlorosulfonic acid.  It was a heavy, fuming liquid, and weighed about 16 pounds per gallon.  In contact with air it reacted with the moisture present to form a mixture of sulfuric and hydrochloric acid mist.

FM reacted with the moisture in the air to form a dense, white, persistent smoke cloud.  It was a compound of titanium tetrachloride.  It was used with carbon dioxide (CO2) as the pressure producing agent, and sometimes with the addition of a small percentage of other chemicals.  The smoke mixture was a corrosive colorless to yellow liquid that weighed 14 pounds to the gallon.  It reacted vigorously with the moisture in the air to form a combination smoke (finely divided titanium hydrate particles) and mist (hydrochloric acid vapor).  Due to the hydrochloric acid, the liquid was highly corrosive, but the smoke, while acrid, was not sufficiently irritating in field concentrations to cause coughing or other physiological effects to the respiratory system.

Careful review of their Action Reports revealed that both types were used:

FLETCHER Class Destroyers

• DD HOEL:  The smoke screen layed proved very effective....  The use of a smoke screen by this task unit was extremely effective, and it is believed that this screen was the main reason our destroyers and destroyer escorts were able to  carry out their missions and stay afloat for so long a time.
  
  
• DD JOHNSTON:  The Captain also ordered the engine room to commence making funnel smoke and ordered the smoke screen generator detail to make FS smoke.  The use of smoke appeared to be effective, and when the ship was behind a screen the enemy firing was very ineffective.  0655 Commenced making FS and funnel smoke.
  
  
• DD HEERMANN:  0702 Commenced making smoke from F.S. generators. 

No destroyer Action Reports detailed the exact smoke screen generator type.  The author makes the assumption from Ordnance Phamphlet No. 1042, Action Reports and photographs that all three FLETCHER Class destroyers used the Mark 1 FS Smoke Screen Generator.  Only JOHNSTON and HEERMANN's Action Reports mention FS by name.  Photographic evidence of HOEL's stern leads to the same conclusion.

BUTLER Class Destroyer Escorts 

• DE DENNIS:  Smoke:  F.M. contents of 12 Mk. 2 tanks.  Smoke:  smoke screen from Mk 6 smoke Generators was highly effective.  The #35, 8 minute nozzle used.  As a results of this action, it is strongly recommended that all destroyer escorts carry a full set of eight extra bottles of FM smoke.  This ship is now fitted to carry four extra bottles; most DE's carry no extras.
  
  
• DE RAYMOND:  We continued to make smoke using both F.M. generators...  Our smoke screen was very effective.  More FM smoke screen generators should be provided this class of vessel, even though it may mean the scacrifice of some deck space alloted to depth charges.  At present, this vesssel has eight FM smoke screen generators and arrangements should be made to carry an additional four generators on the stern.
  
  
• DE BUTLER:  0826 Smoke generator was fully expended...  Use of defensive smoke screens was highly effective and appeared to bother the enemy a great deal.  In a one-sided engagement such as this, smoke is of extreme importance, and, yet, after thirty-five minutes, our smoke supply was exhausted.  Fortunately, stack smoke was very effective, due to atmospheric conditions.  It is therefore recommended that better smoke-generating equipment be provided as soon as possible.
  
  
• DE ROBERTS:  ...this vessel laid tremendously effective smoke screens, both black funnel and white FS....  JOHNSTON immediatedly commenced laying heavy black funnel smoke, followed by FS smoke from ROBERTS...  The use of smoke screen by this Task Unit was extremely effective.  ROBERTS found that an extremely effective screen was made by laying heavy black funnel on top of white FS.  It is believed that the fact that the escort vessels were alternately able to momentarily throw off the Japanese gunnery by moving into the smoke of other escorts materially prolonged the life of those escorts.  Although the ship had exercised at laying FS smoke, no drills had been held in making funnel smoke.  However, without any delay the engineers force furnished funnel smoke equal to that of any other ship.

The author makes the assumption from Ordnance Phamphlet No. 1042, Action Reports and photographs that all BUTLER Class destroyer escorts used either the Mark 4 or Mark 6 FM Smoke Screen Generator.  Only DENNIS and RAYMOND's Action Reports mention FM by name.  Photographic evidence of DENNIS' stern in December 1944 clearly shows two Mark 4 FM Smoke Screen Generators.  However, ROBERTS mention of FS four times in her Action Report leaves a question mark.

USE BY CVE's OF TAFFY III 

Careful review of escort carrier Action Reports revealed the following concering the use of smoke

• FANSHAW BAY:  0656  Screen ordered to make smoke astern of carriers in order to disrupt enemy gun fire.  0703 Making smoke....  Smoke made from our starboard stacks (crossing the flight deck to the port quarter), as well as that made by a DD and a DE first on our starboard quarter, then our the port quarter, hid the after portion of the ship most effectively....  This ship experimented with using an aircraft smoke tank located on the after sponson to augment the stack smoke.  This was satisfactory except that the location of the tank was such that the chemical was blown back upon the gun crew of the 5-inch stern gun, so this type smoke was discontinued.  Engineer Officer: At 0705 started laying smoke screen.  Ceased laying smoke screen at 0715 and at 0758 agained ordered to lay smoke screen.  At 0815 requested permission from bridge to blow tubes due to excessive stack temperature and permission granted.  At 0836 received orders from bridge to cease laying smoke screen.
  
  
• SAINT LO:  0730 Destroyers and Destroyer Escorts of the screen started laying a smoke screen.  A smoke tank aft (starboard side) was hit by a piece of enemy shrapnel and the smoke started leaking out.  ...all carriers stated making smoke.... 
  
  
• WHITE PLAINS:  Smoke pouring from one port and one starboard stack undoubtedly deceived the enemy into believing that our ship had been hit and was burning as an immediate result of the first series of very close salvos.  0705 Commenced making smoke. 
  
  
• KALININ BAY:  0705 Destroyers and carriers were ordered to make smoke screen. 
  
  
• KITKUN BAY:  0700 Ship commenced making dense black smoke for concealment.  0930 order issued to cease making smoke.  ...a dense and effective smoke screen was laid.... 
  
  
• GAMBIER BAY:  0710 Destroyer screen deployed making smoke to cover the CVE group.  As has been noted elsewhere in this report all ships of the Task Unit, on orders from the OTC, made an effective volume of smoke, which undoubtedly in combination with a rain squall, adversely affected the enemy's gunnery and caused a reduction of damage to all CVE's of the disposition, particularly from the heavy guns in the enemys main body.  Smoke, however, afforded no protection to this ship from fire of the cruisers on our eastern, windward flank.

FS SMOKE SCREEN GENERATORS

There were three Navy generators designed for generation of FS smoke screens from surface vessels, the Mark 1, Mark 2, and Mark 5.  The Mark 1 generator was designed for use on destroyers (including the FLETCHER Class) and larger vessels.  The Mark 2 and Mark 5 generators are designed for use on smaller vessels.

MARK 1 FS SMOKE SCREEN GENERATOR.  The Mark 1 Smoke Screen Generator and Modifications was  composed of four 35-gallon Mark 1 smoke screen tanks, which were mounted as a single unit.  Each tank had  its own pressure line, exhaust tube, and nozzles.  The complete unit of four tanks could be immediately jettisoned, either locally by pulling the manual emergency release lever, or remotely by a quick operating air valve.  The tanks were designed for operation at pressures ranging up to 150 pounds per square inch.  The generator tanks were fabricated from welded sheet monel (nickel and copper, with some iron) metal.  Within each tank were baffle plates to add strength and minimize surging, and a discharge tube, the purpose of which was to empty the tank as completely as possible by taking the liquid from the low end.  On the outside of each tank were two reinforcing bands, which located and restrained the tank in its mounting; a filling fitting; a flange for smoke exhaust line connection; and a pipe threaded air inlet tube.

_{U.S. Navy Technical Drawing}

Mark 1 FS Smoke Screen Generator

The Mark 1 smoke screen tanks were mounted in saddles, the lower set of two being welded to the emergency release carrier, while the upper two rested on the lower two tanks.  The tank reinforcing bands served to properly position the upper two saddles.  The tanks and upper saddles were secured to the release carrier by tank anchoring slings.  The clevis bolts of these slings extended through the cable anchor brackets, the slings being secured and tightened in place by common nuts which, in turn, were secured by check nuts.  Spherical washers were provided so that the clevis bolt nuts would not bear directly against the cable and anchor brackets.  The emergency release carrier was, in effect, a skid upon which were mounted the generator tanks.  It also mounted all piping necessary to conduct air from a single connection (which was fixed to the ship's structure) to each tank, and to the piping and nozzles by which the smoke mixture was discharged from the individual tanks.  The carrier was restrained vertically by four keys, one adjacent to each corner, which engaged suitable parts of the carrier rack.  The carrier was normally held in place on the carrier rack by means of a latch bracket secured to the inboard end of the emergency release carrier. This bracket was fitted with a toggle pin which restrained the latch, and this toggle pin had to be removed from the bracket before the carrier could be jettisoned.

_{U.S. Navy Photograph}

USS HOEL's Mark 1 FS Smoke Screen Generators, covered and
protected from the weather, especially the sun, and from salt water spray.

Generator air piping, which started at the permanent supply line and terminated in the air coupling body at the inboard end of the carrier rack, consisted of an air coupling cap, a section of flexible hose, and a piping manifold arranged so that the flexible hose could be connected at either side, and contained two double branch laterals providing four connections from which connecting pipes ran to each individual tank.  A three-eighths inch stop valve, to select the particular tank or tanks for discharge, and a spring loaded ball check valve, to check the air line against the smoke mixture, were provided in each line from manifold to tank. Generator smoke lines, which were individual lines, each contained a 1.0 inch stop valve, ran from each tank to one of four spray nozzles, these spray nozzles being mounted at the outboard end of the emergency release carrier.

The spray nozzles were intended to emit the smoke mixture in finely divided form, the resulting spray to form a comparatively wide cone.  Nozzles were made adjustable in order to obtain the optimum spray, but the adjustment, once determined, was not intended to be altered in service except to re-establish the original setting.  Filling were provided for each tank.  They were intended for use only when tanks were to be filled with smoke mixture, or when, having been discharged, tanks were to be flushed with water.  Under normal operating conditions, a filling cap was never opened unless the tank was known to have been completely discharged, and then only with precautions.

FM SMOKE SCREEN GENERATORS

There were two smoke screen generators designed to use FM for the generation of smoke screens from surface vessels, the Mark 6 and Mark 4.

MARK 6 FM SMOKE SCREEN GENERATOR.  The Mark 6 Smoke Screen Generator consisted of a smoke screen tank Mark 2, fitted with a manual control valve and an exhaust tube designed to operate with or without one of four different sized nozzles.  Integral with the valve was a syphon tube extending into the tank and converting the tank into a steel syphon bottle.

_{U.S. Navy Technical Drawing}

Mark 6 FM Smoke Screen Generator

The smoke tank Mark 2 was a commercial ICC-3A480 full spun steel ammonia cylinder with a capacity of about 33 gallons. It was designed for a working pressure of 480 pounds per square inch, and is tested at 800 pounds per square inch.  The valve was brass, with a copper syphon tube sweated into it with soft solder.  The exhaust tube was stainless steel, and the four nozzles were brass.  Chained to the exhaust tube was a rubber cap, which fit onto the end of the tube, or onto any of the nozzles to prevent water from entering the tube when the generator was not in use.  Smoke screen control was obtained by the choice of the nozzle used. The rate of discharge varied with the size of the nozzle.  The discharge time also varied with the pressure, and therefore with the temperature.  As an example, the discharge time with the No. 42, the smallest, nozzle was about 25 minutes at 45°F and only 12 3/4 minutes at approximately 75°F.

MARK 4 FM SMOKE SCREEN GENERATOR.  The Mark 4 Smoke Screen Generator was essentially four Mark 6 generators mounted on a single frame.  Each held 22 gallons of FM with CO2 as the dispersing pressure agent.  It was used on such vessels as destroyers.  All instructions and precautions given for the Mark 6 generator were equally applicable to each unit of the Mark 4 smoke screen generator.  

_{U.S. Navy Technical Drawing}

Mark 4 FM Smoke Screen Generator 

The filling of the Mark 4 and Mark 6 smoke screen generators was the same, except that with the Mark 4 generator there were four tanks to fill.  Each tank was filled in two steps: First, 310 pounds (22 gallons) of FM or modified FM were poured into the tank, then 16 pounds of CO2 was added.  Either Navy Filling Equipment Mark 1 Modification 4 or improvised equipment was used for the FM filling.  If the Navy equipment was used, the strainer was first removed. 

 _{U.S. Navy Photograph}

USS DENNIS's Mark 4 FM Smoke Screen Generators.
Photo taken at her refit in San Francisco in December 1944. 

The CO2 filling line was similar to the one used to refill fire extinguishers except that one end was modified to fit the generator valve at the exhaust tube connection.  This line included a flow pump if possible, otherwise gravity flow was used with the CO2 cylinder raised a few feet above the generator tank.

The FM or modified FM was available in 55-gallon steel drums.  Each drum had two openings with standard pipe threads, a three-fourths inch opening at one end and a two inch opening in the side.  The CO2 was provided in 50 pound lots in cylinders.  Only liquid CO2 was used. 

DEPLOYMENT OF COMBAT ESCORT CARRIERS

In each successive amphibious operation the escort carriers have undertaken an increasing share of the direct air support.  This mission has been accomplished heretofore in a uniformly excellent manner.  The experience of the Leyte campaign, however, has shown that the demands of current and probable future operations are beyond the reasonable capabilities of these vessels, and that their future employment in furnishing air support will probably be precluded.

Our Pacific offensive has suddenly projected us into the inner defenses of Japan.  We are on the point of severing the supply and communication lines between the homeland and that occupied empire to the south which furnishes raw materials and fuel.  At the same time we have captured and are expanding positions from which air forces should blast and burn down the major industrial-population centers of Japan which manufacture and construct the weapons of war.

The enemy fully appreciates the disaster which faces him: hence the fieroeness of his ground resistance at SIAPAN and PELLELIU, the commitment of his entire fleet in opposing the Leyte occupation, and the recent fanatical suicide attacks of his airmen.

If our reports and claims have not been grossly over-exaggerated, the enemy has now lost or had severely damaged the bulk of his surface naval forces.  Teh latter therefore constitute a greatly reduced threat which permits a corresponding reduction of our own naval forces held ready to counter his possible actions.  But the scale of his resistance will certainly continue at the maximum of which he is still capable, employing all arms and branches to their absolute limit.

In these circumstances it would appear that the time has come to employ units of the fast carrier task forces for the primary direct air support of major amphibious operations in the Western Pacific, and to relegate the CVE's to tasks more in line with their original concept and proven capabilities.  The CVE's have done and can still do a fine job within their limitations.  When more is required, the task must be turned over to ships more adequate to the demands.

LIMITATIONS OF CVE'S

There has been an increasing  tendency to present the combat escort carriers, when operated in suitable numbers, as comparing rather favorably with the fast carriers in practically all essentials except speed.  This can perhaps be charged to over-enthusiasm resulting from the highly creditable and thorough manner in which CVE's have heretofore furnished support for amphibious operations.  When the going got tough, however, and these ships were subjected to serious enemy surface and air action as was the case at LEYTE, the deficiencies and limitations of the class became extremely pointed.  The major features contributing to this unfavorable status are:

(a) A maximum sustained speed of about 18.5 knots, with the resulting restriction on choice of position, defensive maneuvering, and ability to operate aircraft under low wind conditions.  The last may require substantial reduction of aircraft loading.

(b) Consequent to (a), plus a short flight deck, the plane complement necessarily comprises types of reduced performance.

(c) Anti-aircraft gun defense is weak, the result both of the numerically limited battery in the carriers and the small screening strength normally furnished.

(d) A mediocre radar installation, with SG and SK only, lacking the comprehensive and efficient coverage given by the SM.

(e) The CVE's are not "hard".  For all practical purposes they are simply converted merchant hulls.  They have little of the compartmentation and generally heavy structure of normal combat vessels designed to obsorb punishment.

(f) Little unity in organization, training and operational experience.  The escort carriers are subject to not infrequent shifts in type of duty performed and in the units with which they work.  The screening vessels assigned are generally "pick-ups" gathered at random for each operation.  The senior command organization is seldom the same.  These are factors which are hardly conducive to the formation of an effective fighting force.

All of these items are not necessarily critical at any one time, but under average service conditions the type is always handicapped to an important degree.

By these stratagems the Japs have eliminated all major threats of air or surface interference for the daylight period necessary to accomplish their objective; they have decisive air superiority from shore fields, and they can bring overwhelming surface superiority to bear in the Leyte Gulf trap.  After the completion of the slaughter, they undoubtedly intended to withdraw through Surigao Strait, where it is possible a CV (subsequently sunk) was waiting to provide air cover for their return to base.  The presence of several enemy submarines on our own retirement route from Leyte to the southwest indicated that the Japs had taken measures to deal with our cripples attempting to reach Woendi, Manus, or Kossol Straits.

The plan was well conceived and so well executed that it came dangerously close to succeeding.  Concealment or surprise were not achieved, nor were they essential providing the bulk of the heavy ships arrived intact.  It was essential that the THIRD FLEET be removed from the opposition, even though some losses had to be accepted to accomplish this, and this part of the plan apparently worked on schedule, including the losses." 

CTU 77.4.32/COMCARDIV 26 Action Report
RADM Ralph A. Ofstie, USN
in USS KITKUN BAY (CVE-71)

This disaster to our force should never have occurred.  It was only by the intervention of Providence that any ships survived; that the Japanese Fleet should turn away at the time when cumulative damage and closing range would have wrought quick and complete destruction.  In my view the following are the factors responsible for this regreattable occurrence:

(a) Failure to observe or guard the passage through San Bernardino Strait.

(b) Failure to conduct a dawn air search to the north-ward under the conditions of obvious danger prevailing.

(c) Failure of this Task Unit to receive timely report of that attack on Leyte Gulf.

On paper, an American victory at Leyte Gulf was not difficult to imagine. The Americans held the advantage in all categories of warships except heavy cruisers. Carrier airpower was by then clearly the striking power of the fleet and therefore contributed significantly to the American victory at Leyte Gulf.

After the battle, Rear Admiral C.A.F. Sprague summed up his account of their ordeal in his Action Report by stating: "...The Japanese gunnery was good as to mean range, poor as to advance range, and with excellent patterns. It is believed they had an airborne spotter overhead. The fact that a large number of shells were AP, non-explosive, resulted in much less damage from hits received.

When the Battle of Leyte Gulf was finished, the Imperial Japanese Combined Fleet could never again threaten the U.S. Navy as a capable offensive fighting force. With their sea lanes to their oil fields and raw materials in the southern region severed and their Navy soundly defeated, Japan would unconditionally surrender in less than one year.

The performance of the escort carrier group at Leyte Gulf, especially Taffy III, was nothing short of miraculous. One week after the engagement, RADM Thomas Sprague sent the following congratulations communique to his well deserving forces who fought at Leyte:

CTU 77.4.22/COMCARDIV 27 Action Report
RADM William D. Sample, USN
in USS MARCUS ISLAND (CVE-77)

All operations of the task unit were conducted smoothly and aggressively, and the unit was given inspiring leadership by the task unit commander, Rear Admiral Felix B. Stump, U.S.N.  In particular, by his cool and logical tactical planning on 25 October 1944 he not only maneuvered his task unit so that it suffered no battle damage but also organized and sent off six heavy strikes against the enemy fleet, which strikes materially assisted in turning the Japanese fleet and prevented further damage to our own forces.

Lieutenant Commander Robert W. Copeland of ROBERTS summarized the performance of his officers and men in his Combined Action Report and Loss of ship report:

"The performance of officers and enlisted personnel of this command was exemplary - in accordance with the very highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.  To witness the conduct of the average enlisted man aboard this vessel, newly inducted, married, unaccustomed to navy ways and with an average of less than one years service would make any man proud to be an average American.  The crew were informed over the loud speaker system at the beginning of the action, of the Commanding Officer's estimate of the situation, that is, a fight against overwhelming odds from which survial could not be expected, during which time we would do what damage we could.  In the face of this knowledge the men zealously manned their stations wherever they might be, and fought and worked with such calmness, courage, and efficiency that no higher honor could be conceived than to command such a group of men."

Commander Leon S. Kintberger of HOEL concluded his Action Report with the following words: 

CTU 77.4.32/COMCARDIV 26 Action Report
RADM Ralph A. Ofstie, USN
in USS KITKUN BAY (CVE-71)

On the morning of 25 October TU 77.4.3 was operating off the east coast of Samar providing routine support for the Leyte Landing Forces when it was surprised and attacked by a major part of the Japanese Fleet.  In the running fight which followed, this unit, while escaping what seemed certain annihilation, lost two of its six CVE's and three of its seven screening vessels.  No vessel of this Task Unit escaped undamaged.

For about two and one half hours this group was under constant attack, endeavoring to outrun an enemy vastly superior in speed and armament, and to avoid a constant and increasing threat of encirclement by enemy's heavy cruisers on the left, his destroyers on the right, and his main body astern.  In this effort some benefits of concealment was derived from the scattered showers  that prevailed during the morning, and more from the use of smoke.  Nevertheless until the moment when the enemy broke off and retired to the north, there appeared only one possible outcome of the encounter - complete annihilation.

Let us never forget the heroism and valor displayed by the likes of CDR Ernest E. Evans, CDR Leon S. Kintberger, and LCDR Robert W. Copeland, all of whom valiantly placed their small warships in harm’s way against impossible odds. They gave their all for the defense of the escort carriers. The name's JOHNSTON, HOEL, and ROBERTS are set in stone in the annals of surface warfare history, never to be forgotten. The GAMBIER BAY although overwhelmed by the heavy cruisers, refusing to strike her colors and admit defeat, reflected U.S. Naval tradition at the epitome of its finest hour. The tragic loss of ST LO as a result of the kamikaze strike proved to the Americans that their enemy was more desperate than ever to save their shrinking empire.  

No matter how great the American superiority was at this point in the war it was still a very long way to final victory in the Pacific. As the Americans drew closer to the Japanese home islands it was only to become more fiercely contested by the cornered Japanese.

Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz , USN
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

"Here Admiral Clifton Sprague, backed by Admiral Stump and Admiral Thomas Sprague, squeezed every possible advantage from wind, rain, smoke, interior position, and air and surface attack to confuse and repulse an immensely superior enemy. Overhead, the escort carrier planes, untrained for attacking ships, performed like fast carrier aircraft at their best. On the surface, Clifton Sprague's little screening vessels, steaming boldly into battleships and cruiser fire, dodging through smoke and rain, chasing salvos, opposing 14- and 16-inch shells with 5-inch when they had expended their torpedoes, provided the slender margin that enabled the air-attack to succeed and most of the escort carriers to escape. The history of the United States Navy records no more glorious two hours of resolution, sacrifice, and success."